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8Presuming the Promotion of the Common Good
by Large-Scale Health Research
The Cases of care.data 2.0 and the 100,000 Genomes Project in
the UK
sigrid sterckx, sandi dheensa and julian
cockbain
8.1 Introduction1
8.1.1 Background
Before World War One (WWI), levels of financial inequality world-
wide had reached previously unknown magnitudes,2 despite forms of
democracy having been introduced into many Western countries.
WWI was, however, to yield a world ‘fit for heroes’,3 one in which
the common person had a fair share. Between WWI and World War
Two (WWII), little was done to reduce inequality. With WWII’s
outbreak, the problem of inequality was set to one side. However,
after Germany had capitulated, the UK general elections brought in
a socialist government whose stated promise was to establish a
‘Welfare State’, to provide education, health, unemployment benefits
and pensions for all, and to nationalise utilities and key
infrastructures.
UK citizens and residents are not required to have identity cards or
record their domicile with the local authorities. However, the UK gov-
ernment and its agents keep extensive data records, e.g. of births, mar-
riages, deaths, passports, driver’s licences, entries into and departures
1 All information in this chapter is up to date as of 6 November 2017.
2 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014).
3 Politician David Lloyd George promised the British public to undertake major reforms to
address education, health, housing and transport inadequacies and to create a land ‘fit for
heroes to live in’.
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from the UK, (un)employment, tax, crime and, not least, healthcare.4 To
some, it may be obvious that it is in the interest of the state to collate these
records to give a clearer picture of the population and to improve the
allocation of state resources. The records are of particular value in
optimising healthcare, crime prevention and education, three of the
primary tasks of the UK government. To others, the spectre of Big
Brother comes to the fore with fears of a totalitarian state such as those
well-known from the last century.
8.1.2 Health Data Collection in the UK
In this chapter, we are concerned with the collection of health-related
data in the UK, in particular those deriving from institutional care (e.g.
care in hospitals – the majority of which are still public institutions),
personal care (e.g. data held by family physicians, known in the UK as
General Practitioners, or GPs, who are not state employees but contrac-
tors) and from specific government initiatives such as UK Biobank (which
holds material and data from about half a million citizens) and the
100,000 Genomes Project (which is to hold information from about
70,000 people with cancers and rare diseases and their relatives, as
discussed further in this chapter).
The collation of such health data clearly could improve the efficiency of
the UK’s National Health Service (NHS),5 for example, by identifying
treatments that are more effective and improving regional allocation of
resources. Research using the collated data may help the development of
new diagnostic and treatment methods and drugs. This may well fall
under the label of ‘We Medicine’,6 understood as accessible and publicly
funded healthcare aiming to benefit all. However, where commercial
players become involved as potential vendors of new products, rather
than simply as contractors for the NHS, the benefits may flow to more
limited sets of individuals.
4 Digital Economy Act 2017, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/30/contents/enacted,
accessed 6 November 2017.
5 As Vezyridis and Timmons explain, health data has also become a valuable source of
income for the NHS. Paraskevas Vezyridis and Stephen Timmons, ‘Understanding the
care.data conundrum: New information flows for economic growth’ (2017) Big Data and
Society. Published online.
6 Donna L. Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine – Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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In April 2005, the UK government set up a (publicly owned) company,
the ‘Health and Social Care Information Centre’, which acquired institu-
tional personal health data with at least the aim of making it available for
research where the researcher was neither within nor a contracted agent
of the NHS. This company (HSCIC-1) went under the names of ‘The
Information Centre’ and the ‘NHS Information Centre’. Following the
enactment of the Health and Social Care Act 2012,7 HSCIC-1 was
dissolved in March 2013 and its functions were transferred to a new
publicly owned company, also called the Health and Social Care
Information Centre, which was created on the following day. This new
company, which we will refer to asHSCIC-2, was empowered to integrate
into its health database the personal health records held by GPs. The
scheme for harvesting GP data was referred to as ‘care.data’, and,
although due to begin in 2014, was suspended that same year. In April
2016, the government announced that, from July 2016, HSCIC-2 would
change its name to NHS Digital, and in July 2016 the care.data scheme
was officially scrapped.8 However, although the name has been dropped
and the ‘consent’ model underlying it has been changed, the scheme
continues, as we will explain.
In the same year as the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the UK
government announced the launch of ‘The 100,000 Genomes Project’
(hereinafter 100kGP) to ‘bring the benefits of personalised medicine to
the NHS’.9 The project involves sequencing the whole genomes of NHS
patients with either a rare disease or cancer. Genomics England, a
company owned by the Department of Health (DoH), is delivering the
project through thirteen Genomic Medicine Centres (GMC) in NHS
trusts.
This project has been developing the infrastructure for a national
genomic medicine service in which whole-genome sequencing will
become a routine and frontline test in cross-cutting areas of medicine.
There are plans to ‘concentrate all NHS genomic testing into the same
7 Health and Social Care Act 2012, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7/contents,
accessed 6 November 2017. This Act epitomised the privatisation of the NHS by facilitat-
ing the contracting of NHS services to private providers. Allyson M. Pollock, Alison
Macfarlane and Sylvia Godden, ‘Dismantling the signposts to public health? NHS data
under the Health and Social Care Act’ (2012) 344 British Medical Journal e2364.
8 George Freeman, ‘Written statement to Parliament: Review of health and care data
security and consent’ (2016), www.gov.uk/government/speeches/review-of-health-and-
care-data-security-and-consent, accessed 6 November 2017.
9 NHS England, ‘Genomics’ (2012), www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/qual-clin-lead/persona
lisedmedicine/genomics, accessed 6 November 2017.
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data centre’with ‘access to . . . industry for the purpose of developing new
knowledge, methods of analysis, medicines, diagnostics and devices’.10
8.1.3 Concerns
The collection of residents’ health-related data undoubtedly has the
potential for public benefit, but is surrounded by concerns regarding
privacy, autonomy and justice. While the UK government’s schemes do,
at least superficially, take these concerns into account, we address in this
chapter what we see as a gap – indeed a gaping chasm – between the
government’s rhetoric and the governance structures they put in place.
By taking a closer look at both in the cases of care.data and the 100kGP,
we demonstrate that what is presented as ‘We Medicine’ in fact falls far
short. We begin our review with care.data before turning to the 100kGP
and the ethical issues we consider to be most pressing.
8.2 Care.data
8.2.1 Current Sharing of Health Data
As David Springate, a biostatistician who works on electronic data base
research at the University of Manchester, has noted:
For a sizeable proportion of the UK population, the sharing of their
electronic medical records . . . is already a reality and has been for decades.
About a third of UK patients already have their electronic medical records
held on the main current UK primary care databases . . . and many have
their pseudoanonymised data accessible (for a fee) to both medical
researchers . . . [and] private companies, including drug companies . . .
In themajority of cases now, patients will not even be aware that their data
are being collected, let alone be offered the opportunity to consent.11
Physician and science writer Ben Goldacre commented:
[A] government body handed over parts of my medical records to people
I’ve never met, outside the NHS andmedical research community, but it is
10 Sally Davies, ‘Generation Genome. Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer’ (2016)
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631043/
CMO_annual_report_generation_genome.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017 (chapters 14
and 2).
11 David Springate, ‘Health database could help avoid another pharma scandal’ (2014) The
Conversation, www.theconversation.com/health-database-could-help-avoid-another-
pharma-scandal-23730, accessed 6 November 2017.
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refusing to tell me what it handed over, or who it gave it to, and the
minister is now incorrectly claiming that it never happened anyway.
There are people in my profession who think they can ignore this pro-
blem. Some are murmuring that this mess is . . . a public misunderstand-
ing to be corrected with better PR. They are wrong: it’s like nuclear power.
Medical data, rarefied and condensed, presents huge power to do good,
but it also presents huge risks. When leaked, it cannot be unleaked; when
lost, public trust will take decades to regain.12
Survey results show that only 54 per cent of the public support commer-
cial access to their health data for health research. However, there is a
clear desire for the NHS to seek permission before allowing access to
companies. Some participants think data access is unacceptable if it is
solely for private benefit and do ‘not want anyone . . . to be able to co-opt
health data for political ends’.13
8.2.2 Concerns Regarding the (Im)Possibility of Opting Out from Care.
data
In April 2013, nine months before care.data launched, Jeremy Hunt, the
UK Secretary of State for Health, gave the public a reassurance that any
patient who did not want personal data in their GP records to be shared
with HSCIC-2 ‘would have their objection respected’.14On 12 September
2013, he added that ‘All they have to do in that case is speak to their GP
and their information won’t leave the GP surgery’.15 Objections to
information leaving the GP surgery became known as a ‘Type 1’ objection.
At the same time, for objections to information leaving the HSCIC-2, a
‘Type 2’ objection, was proposed.16
The option to opt out of care.data is not overseen by the Information
Commissioner’s Office (the ICO), and is not guaranteed by law.
Moreover, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA), the law that
12 Ben Goldacre, ‘Care.data is in chaos. It breaks my heart’ (2014) The Guardian, 28
February.
13 Wellcome Trust/IPSOSMori, ‘The one-waymirror: Public attitudes to commercial access
to health data’ (2016), www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/5200–03/sri-well
come-trust-commercial-access-to-health-data.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
14 Fiona Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’ (2016), www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535024/data-security-
review.PDF, accessed 6 November 2017.
15 Department of Health (DoH), ‘Jeremy Hunt confirms commitment to balance patient
safety and privacy’ (2013), www.gov.uk/government/news/jeremy-hunt-confirms-com
mitment-to-balance-patient-safety-and-privacy–2, accessed 6 November 2017.
16 Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’.
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provided the basis for the care.data scheme, ‘trumps’ key provisions of
the Data Protection Act 1998.17 Specifically, the HSCA allows all patient
data to be used for purposes that extend beyond patient care without
consultation, i.e. without the patients’ knowledge. Indeed, the HSCA
makes it impossible for patients to prevent their data from being used for
research.
In autumn 2013, NHS England set up a care.data website where
citizens could record their views and in January 2014 an information
leaflet on care.data was sent to all English households.18 However,
public concern rose, as did concern among General Practitioners.
Many patients began to take advantage of the opportunity to opt
out that Hunt had offered. Hunt had effectively promised that the
data for those who opted out would not be harvested from the GPs’
records. In reality, the intent was to harvest that data anyway and
then ‘de-identify’ their records.19
Amendments to the HSCA in the Care Act 201420 went some way
towards addressing public concerns regarding confidentiality and inap-
propriate use of patient health data, not least by allowing data releases
only ‘for the purposes of the provision of healthcare or adult social care,
or the promotion of health’. However, this amendment clearly does not
prevent data being made available to drug researchers, pharmaceutical
firms and tech giants like Google.
Care.data was not just problematic for patients. As Vezyridis and
Timmons21 observe, the new obligation on GPs to share data with
HSCIC-2 created pressure on GPs who are responsible for telling patients
about a scheme that they know little about themselves. As data control-
lers with legal liability for their patients’ information, they face conflict-
ing statutory obligations to process patient data fairly and yet disclose
17 Jamie Grace and Mark J. Taylor, ‘Disclosure of confidential patient information and the
duty to consult: The role of the health and social care information centre’ (2013) 21(3)
Medical Law Review 415–47; Data Protection Act 1998, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1998/29/contents, accessed 6 November 2017.
18 Vezyridis and Timmons point out that the leaflet was sent out without checks, was biased
towards the programme’s benefits and had little information about the so-called opt-outs.
It was later deemed ‘unfit for purpose’. (Vezyridis and Timmons, ‘Understanding the
care.data conundrum’).
19 NHS England, ‘Privacy impact assessment: care.data’ (2014), www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/cd-pia.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
20 Care Act 2014, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents, accessed 6 November
2017.
21 Paraskevas Vezyridis and Stephen Timmons, ‘Dissenting from care.data: an analysis of
opt-out forms’ (2016) 42(12) Journal of Medical Ethics 792–6.
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data. Many GP practices provided patients with opt-out forms, but they
provided extremely variable information and could have been confusing
and unintentionally misleading.
With many GPs showing concern, in February 2014 the government
decided to delay GP data harvesting to allow NHS England the opportu-
nity to persuade GPs, healthcare professionals and patients that care.data
was necessary and that sufficient safeguards had been put in place. Key
elements of the discussions included: appropriate consent mechanisms
for data collection and use; the right to object to processing of personal
data; the extent of the data collected; and the uses of the data by the NHS
or third parties. Citizens also raised several of these concerns.22
In September 2015, Hunt bought more time for care.data by commis-
sioning the National Data Guardian, Fiona Caldicott, to review the
protection of personal health data and the provision of appropriate
opt-outs. The Caldicott Review could then be held out as legitimately
dealing with the public’s concerns. Shortly thereafter, in November 2015,
one concerned GP, Dr Neil Bhatia, made a request under the Freedom of
Information Act asking whether the extraction of GP data would still be
the same care.data scheme, albeit with an ‘updated’ dataset, or whether it
would be an additional, parallel, extraction for a different project. The
following month, NHS England confirmed that ‘There will be a single
national GP dataset which would therefore replace the dataset as cur-
rently defined for the care.data pathfinder stage.’23
8.2.3 The Caldicott Review
In July 2016, the UK government issued the long-awaited report on the
initiation of the Iraq War, the Chilcot Report. Astonishingly, on the same
day, the Caldicott Review24 was issued, and the UK government announced
that the care.data scheme had been scrapped. However, it stated that it
remained ‘absolutely committed to realising the benefits of sharing information
22 Sigrid Sterckx, Vojin Rakic, Julian Cockbain et al., ‘“You hoped we would sleep walk into
accepting the collection of our data”: Controversies surrounding the UK care.data scheme
and their wider relevance for biomedical research’ (2016) 19(2) Medicine, Health Care
and Philosophy 177–90; Rebecca Hays and Gavin Daker-White, ‘The care.data consensus?
A qualitative analysis of opinions expressed on Twitter’ (2015) 15 BMC Public Health 838.
23 NHS England, Letter dated 10 December 2015, responding to a Freedom of Information
Request by Dr Neil Bhatia, www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/single_national_gp_data
set_2, accessed 6 November 2017.
24 Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’.
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. . .Therefore, this workwill nowbe taken forward . . . in order to retain public
confidence and to drive better care for patients’ (emphasis added).25
The Caldicott Review was clear that it had been an exercise in gen-
erating public trust in the use of their health data:
This has been a report about trust. . . . Because of the importance of
earning public trust, the Review concluded that people should be able to
opt out of their personal confidential data being used for purposes beyond
their direct care unless there is a mandatory legal requirement or an
overriding public interest.26 (emphasis added)
However, Caldicott recommended that: confidential patient information
should nonetheless be collected by HSCIC-2, irrespective of any opt-out
by individual patients; and that ‘data that has been de-identified [by
HSCIC-2] according to the [Information Commissioner’s Office’s] anon-
ymisation code should not be subject to the opt-out’ (emphasis added).27
Interestingly, Caldicott noted the government’s decision to re-brand
HSCIC-2 as NHS Digital saying that ‘[t]his will provide [HSCIC-2]
with a good opportunity to use the NHS brand to make it clear to
everyone that it is part of the NHS “family”’.28
Since the effects of the opt-outs proposed by Caldicott would conflict
with the Type 1 opt-out promised by Hunt in relation to care.data,
Caldicott recommended that ‘the Government should consider the
future of the care.data programme’.29 More particularly, Caldicott
noted that applying the Type 1 opt-out ‘to all HSCIC[-2] data collections,
including existing data collections from hospitals, would degrade the
quality of data currently available to . . . researchers’.30 It is thus abun-
dantly clear that the function of the Caldicott Review was to advise the
government how to restart the care.data scheme for the same purposes, but
without the risk of public outcry and without Hunt’s misleading promise
that opting-out would prevent data being harvested from the GP records.
We refer to the ‘new’ scheme as care.data 2.0.
Rhetoric aside, Caldicott proposed that NHS England consider two
approaches to opt-outs, and present these to patients on forms with tick-
boxes. One approach offers two alternatives (which we will label, for
clarity, ‘broad’ – the default option – and ‘narrow’), while the other also
adds a third (which we will label ‘limited’):
25 Freeman, ‘Written statement to Parliament: Review of health and care data security and
consent’.
26 Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’. 27 Ibid., p. 8.
28 Ibid., p. 7. 29 Ibid., p. 8. 30 Ibid., p. 34.
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Broad: ‘Information about me can be used to run the NHS and social care
system and to support research to improve treatment and care for everyone.’
Limited: ‘Information about me can be used to run the NHS and social care
system, but not for research.’
Narrow: ‘Information about me can only be used by the people directly
providing my care.’
This way of representing the opt-outs is problematic for at least three
reasons. First, in the wording of each of the options, the patient is told
that this relates to ‘information about me’, while the opt-out applies to
‘confidential patient information’. The patient is given no indication that
the latter is a term with a specific and narrow legal definition (see below)
and that the HSCIC-2 is free to share de-identified, pseudonymised or
anonymised data (which patients think is also ‘information about me’31)
with anyone as long as it is ‘for the purposes of the provision of healthcare
or adult social care, or the promotion of health’. The information pro-
vided also fails to make clear the technical limitations of pseudonymisa-
tion as a de-identification technique.32 Second, in the Limited option, the
patient is not offered the choice between research by or for the NHS and
research by and for commercial organisations,33 and hence is ‘nudged’
away from this option. Third, in the Narrow option, the patient is not
advised that persons directly providing their care are not just the physi-
cians and other healthcare professionals with whom they interact.
This misleading nature of the Caldicott opt-outs is also shown in the
language used in introducing the proposed opt-outs:
You are protected by the law. Your personal confidential information will
only ever be used where allowed by law . . . [Y]ou can ask your health care
professional not to pass on particular information to others involved in
providing your care. You have the right to opt out.You have the right to opt
out of your personal confidential information being used for these other
purposes beyond your direct care . . . This opt-out will be respected by all
31 Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori, ‘The one-way mirror’.
32 Kieron O’Hara, Transparent Government, Not Transparent Citizens: A Report on Privacy
and Transparency for the Cabinet Office (Southampton: University of Southampton,
2011).
33 Caldicott noted that ‘people hold contrasting views about information being used for
purposes beyond direct care and some people became concerned when data is shared
outside the NHS “family”’. Nevertheless, she took the view that the opt-out model ‘should
be set around the purpose to which data is put . . . and that dividing up NHS and “non-
NHS organisations” without reference to purpose can be artificial and misleading’. This
decision is highly problematic, as we will explain in the section on ethical questions.
Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’, p. 23.
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organisations that use health and social care information . . . You can
change your mind . . .34 (emphasis added)
In sum, the Caldicott Review makes it clear that the opt-out only
applies to data from which the patient may be directly identified, and
even then only to data supplied to those not involved directly with the
patient’s care, with ‘direct care’ being defined more broadly than the
normal person would understand this term. This is problematic, as a
Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori35 report shows that people are already
unclear about who can access their data. The obfuscatory language in
the Caldicott Review will only exacerbate the confusion.
8.2.4 Has the GDPR Any Effect?
In 2016, the EU enacted the General Data Protection Regulation
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679, GDPR), a law that came into force in EU
member states in May 2018. Under Article 18(1)(d) GDPR, people are
given ‘the right to obtain . . . restriction of processing . . . [of data relating
to them] pending the verification whether the legitimate grounds of the
[data] controller override those of the data subject’ (emphasis added).
Article 21(1) GDPR, moreover, states that ‘The data subject shall have the
right to object . . . to processing of personal data . . . unless the [data]
controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the proces-
sing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data sub-
ject. . . ’ (emphasis added).
However, Article 6(1) GDPR reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that [it is necessary]: for
compliance with a legal obligation to which the [data] controller is subject . . .
[or] for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the [data] controller. (emphasis added)
Perhaps not surprisingly, the GDPR thus allows EU member states to
override the data subject’s rights in certain (if not most) circumstances
concerning state use. Until at least March 2019 the UK is covered by EU
regulations. Thus it will come as no surprise that the UK government has
introduced in the House of Lords the Data Protection Bill,36which, when
accepted, will be UK law.
34 Ibid., p. 39. 35 Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori, ‘The one-way mirror’.
36 Data Protection Bill [HL], www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017–2019/
0066/18066.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
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In Section 15 of the Data Protection Bill, the relevant government
minister is to be given the right to override the GDPRwithout Parliament
approval, by issuance of a Rule:
– to adapt the application of rules of the GDPR . . . for compliance with a
legal obligation, for the performance of a task in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority;
– [under Article 23(1) GDPR to restrict] the scope of the obligations [to]
and rights [of the data subject] . . . to safeguard certain objectives of general
public interest; [and]
– [under Article 89 GDPR] to provide for derogations from the rights
mentioned in paragraphs (2) and (3) of that Article . . . for scientific . . .
research [or] statistical purposes (emphasis added)37
In other words, the Data Protection Bill, when passed, will allow free use
of de-identified personal health data.
8.2.5 Post-Caldicott: The ‘National Data Lake’
Following the issue of the Caldicott Review, but before releasing its
response, in July 2017 the government undertook a consultation exer-
cise38 and in August 2017 a document setting out the proposals for a
‘Target Architecture’ for care.data 2.0 was leaked to the press.39
37 Article 23(1) GDPR, in relevant part, reads: ‘Member State law . . . may restrict . . . the
obligations and rights provided for in Articles [18 and 21 GDPR] when such a restriction
. . . is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard . . .
important objectives of general public interest of . . . a Member State, in particular . . . an
important economic or financial interest of the . . . Member State, including . . . public
health’ (emphasis added). Likewise, Article 89 GDPR, in relevant part, reads: ‘Processing
. . .. in the public interest [or for] scientific . . . research purposes or statistical purposes,
shall be subject to appropriate safeguards . . . Where those purposes can be fulfilled by
further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data
subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.’ (emphasis added). Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), Official Journal L 119/1, 4 May 2016.
38 Department of Health, ‘Your data – Better security, better choice, better care. Government
response to the National Data Guardian for Health Care’s Review of data security. Consent
and opt-outs and the Care Quality Commission’s Review “Safe data, safe care”’ (2017), www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/627493/
Your_data_better_security_better_choice_better_care_government_response.pdf, accessed 6
November 2017.
39 NHS England, ‘Enabling evidence-based continuous improvement. The Target
Architecture. Connecting care settings and improving patient experience’ (2017),
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The consultation exercise showed the importance of public trust but
had also indicated that, while a need for a national data collection existed,
the public is ‘less willing to share their data when the direct benefit for
them and their local population is unclear’.40 The proposal is thus to
harvest data into local pools, each representing the maximum size for
which a high degree of public trust can be predicted: about 2–5 million
people. With a common architecture in the format of each pool, and with
a national spine making the pools interconnectable, a ‘National Data
Lake’ will be created which merely appears to be a set of local pools for
local people.
NHS England effectively admits this in the target architecture plan:
Sensitive personal and confidential data (which is fully identifiable) will
almost certainly be required to achieve interoperability and to facilitate
precision medicine and case finding. The [Caldicott] Review opt-out will
not apply.41
Such data, however, obviously remains sensitive. It is ‘confidential
patient information’, a term which is precisely defined by law and does
not mean personal health records in general, as most people would think.
It refers to information42 which, without a court order, generally cannot
be released to parties outside the NHS and its contracted agents without
the patient’s consent, distinguishing it from information that the NHS is
permitted to release without the patient’s consent, even if the patient has
opted out.
Care.data 2.0 thus involves NHS Digital collecting confidential
patient information, and, by de-identifying it, creating a database of
https://medconfidential.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017–07-13-Target-
Architecture.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
40 NHS England, ‘Enabling evidence-based continuous improvement’, p. 35.
41 Ibid., p. 31.
42 National Health Service Act 2006, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/41/contents,
accessed 6 November 2017. Section 251(10) defines ‘patient information’ as follows: ‘(a)
information (however recorded) which relates to the physical or mental health or con-
dition of an individual, to the diagnosis of his condition or to his care or treatment, and
(b) information (however recorded) which is to any extent derived, directly or indirectly,
from such information, whether or not the identity of the individual in question is
ascertainable from the information.’ However, Section 251(11) goes on to make clear
that patient information is ‘confidential patient information’where: ‘(a) the identity of the
individual in question is ascertainable—(i) from that information, or (ii) from that
information and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come
into the possession of, the person processing that information, and (b) that information
was obtained or generated by a person who, in the circumstances, owed an obligation of
confidence to that individual.’
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‘non-confidential’ information. The new Caldicott opt-outs have no effect
whatsoever on the release to any party of personal health data which has
been ‘de-identified’, to whatever extent the government sees fit.
The government warmly welcomed and supported Caldicott’s recom-
mendations, and HSCIC was duly rebranded as NHS Digital. A national
data opt-out is being prepared, i.e. a single opt-out to replace the Type 1
and Type 2 opt-outs (to prevent uploading of GP data to HSCIC-2’s
database, and to prevent release of identifiable data by HSCIC-2, respec-
tively). This national opt-out is to be available fromMarch 2018. In effect,
the only thing the national opt-out will provide is the right to prevent
fully identifiable data from being used for research and ‘planning’.
The timeline set out in the government’s response to the Caldicott
Review sets a date of September 2019 for NHSDigital to implement a new
mechanism to de-identify data on collection fromGP practices, so we can
presume that this is likely to be the new start date for care.data 2.0.
8.3 The UK 100,000 Genomes Project
8.3.1 Background, Focus and Patient Recruitment
The 100kGP is a hybrid of a biobank for research (including by industry
and commercial actors) and clinical practice (in that participating in the
project might lead to a diagnosis or to the identification of a treatment for
that patient’s presenting condition).
The 100kGP is being delivered and implemented using existing NHS
resources. NHS clinicians treating potentially eligible patients identify
and refer them to the project. Those who want to take part have
a preliminary discussion with a healthcare worker and are sent informa-
tion documents to read. Genomics England has designed these
documents via piloting with public/patient involvement groups and
discussion with different advisory committees. Notably, research showed
that some patients found the documents too lengthy and complex and
they have been revised.43
At least 24 hours after receiving the information, patients and family
members are seen in a face-to-face consent appointment with NHS staff
at a Genomic Medicine Centre. There, they give samples of blood, tissue
and saliva which are sent to the sequencing hub. The sequence data
are sent for storage to Genomics England’s data centre. Genome data
43 Caroline Benjamin, ‘Findings from the National Consent Evaluation’ (2016) www.geno
micsengland.co.uk/consent-evaluation-findings, accessed 6 November 2017.
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are then combined with data about the patient from their hospital or
clinic, their GP records, national disease registries, social care records
and Public Health England. The data is to be extracted over the patient’s
whole life into a database built in partnership with NHS Digital. In a bid
to protect privacy, the linked dataset is ‘de-identified’. The samples are
also stored for future research. These sample and data banks are con-
trolled by Genomics England (although what will happen to them once
the project is over will be left to the Secretary of State for Health to
decide).
The project shares some similarities with the 500,000-participant
strong UK Biobank,44 which also collected biomaterial and detailed
health-related information linked to GP and hospital data. The key
differences are that UK Biobank had broad recruitment criteria and
offered test results such as blood pressure readings and body mass
index, while 100kGP recruitment is more tightly linked to the NHS
patient ‘family’ and provides results from tests otherwise unavailable
through the NHS (whole-genome sequencing and, eventually, other
‘omics’). Many patients and families in the rare diseases arm will be
those who have had earlier tests which failed to achieve a diagnosis.
Whole genome sequencing is a last hope after a long ‘diagnostic odyssey’.
Although patients and family members are told that diagnoses are not
guaranteed, they are told they are possible. In fact, newspaper coverage of
the project’s pilot phase has shown that several patients in the rare disease
arm have been diagnosed.
Tested people can also opt to have their genomes searched against a
constantly updated predefined list of ‘additional findings’ for potentially
serious but actionable risks, e.g. familial hypercholesterolemia and famil-
ial cancer syndromes. This offer – as Genomics England’s Chief Scientific
Officer Mark Caulfield suggests – is made on the basis of increasing
fairness and trustworthiness: ‘[patients] have entrusted us with their
genomic information, it seems only fair that we can offer . . . options
. . . [that] may benefit their future health’.45 Genomics England sends
reports to physicians about their patients, and so any feedback about
results is offered as part of clinical consultations.
44 UK Biobank, ‘Participants’ (2016) www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/participants, accessed 6
November 2017.
45 Genomics England, ‘100,000 Genomes Project gains ethical approval to offer NHS
patients further information about their genomic results’ (2015) www.genomicseng
land.co.uk/100k-genomes-projectp-gains-ethical-approval-to-offer-nhs-patients-
further-information-about-their-genomic-results, accessed 6 November 2017.
168 sigrid sterckx, sandi dheensa and julian cockbain
The focus is on rare diseases since, in 80 per cent of cases, these
diseases have a genomic basis. Although individually uncommon, the
diseases affect 6–7 per cent of the UK population. Finding the genetic
cause can shed light on the nature of the disease, its prognosis and
potential treatments, and areas for further research. Half of new cases
of such disease are found in children. The list of eligible rare diseases
consists of: diseases for which there is a clinical diagnosis but no mole-
cular diagnosis and no readily detectable genetic mutation in known
disease-related genes; diseases for which there is a suspected clinical
diagnosis; and diseases that are ‘ultra-rare’. Since comparing sequences
can aid interpretation, multiple family members are invited to participate
in the project.
In the cancer arm, patients’ germline genomes and the genomes of
their cancers will be sequenced, because mutations in tumours are a
central factor in determining the progression of the cancer and its likely
response to therapy. The project’s focus on cancer is unsurprising: in the
UK, cancer killed 160,000 people in 2014 and over 350,000 new cases
were reported that same year. Given that cancer is extremely heteroge-
neous, even among people with the ‘same’ diagnosis, the stated aim of the
project here is to make diagnoses that are more precise, as well as to find
better, more ‘personalised’, treatment choices – i.e. those that have a
better balance of response rate to toxic side effects. Genomics research
has already led to success in this respect, showing that HER2 positive
breast cancers respond to the drug Herceptin (trastuzumab).
8.3.2 Research and Development
One of the project’s aims – enabling new scientific discovery and insight –
is said to be possible only through research on the genomic and clinical
information. Thus for patients, having their clinical tests and any chance of
a diagnosis is presented as being contingent upon giving broad consent to
future, unspecified research on their data. Some of this research is to be
done by industry and commercial companies. This is said to be because: ‘if
any new diagnostic tests and treatments are to come from this project, they
will need to be developed, as they always have been, by the private sector
and not within government or the NHS’.46
46 Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, ‘West London Genomic Medicine Centre’, www
.chelwest.nhs.uk/about-us/research-development/west-london-genomic-medicine-cen
tre, accessed 6 November 2017. This is of course misleading. Many diagnostic tests and
pharmaceuticals have been discovered and developed, if not commercially marketed, by
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There are strict restrictions about who can access the data for research.
Insurers, marketers and other government agencies, such as the police,
are disallowed automatic access, although the police and Home Office
can seek a court order for access. Researchers can access only de-identi-
fied subsets of the data for research purposes approved by the ‘access
review committee’, in a monitored, secure data environment. Priority
and royalty-free access to data is given to members of the Genomics
England Clinical Interpretation Partnerships (GeCIPs) which are
domains of over 2000 researchers, clinicians, trainees and funders from
academia, charitable organisations, government or healthcare. GeCIPs
will carry out research into particular disease-types or cross-cutting
issues (e.g. health economics) and get free access because their research
will aid the interpretation of data. Researchers who do not meet the
eligibility criteria to join a GeCIP (e.g. private healthcare institutions or
commercial companies) will be able to access the dataset for a fee.
Regarding intellectual property and patenting, Genomics England has
adopted a relatively standard approach to inventions made by public
bodies carrying out research on its data: patents may be sought and may
be licensed to commercial entities and academic institutions on favour-
able terms. Genomics England also states that there may be cases where it
decides not to patent an invention for public policy reasons, e.g. if it
would serve the public interest to make the invention freely available for
use. The key question, of course, is the extent to which patent rights may
vest in commercial entities carrying out research on its data.
8.3.3 Funders and Commercial Actors Involved
Genomics England is largely government funded: the UK government
committed £250million as part of its 2016 spending review after an initial
investment of £300 million. The Medical Research Council contributed
£24 million towards computing power for the analysis and interpretation
of data. NHS England agreed to underwrite an NHS contribution of up to
£20 million over the duration of the project. The Wellcome Trust con-
tributed £27 million towards a sequencing facility near Cambridge, UK.
Illumina, the US biotechnology company carrying out the genome
sequencing, is investing £162 million in return for its £78 million sequen-
cing contract.
the public sector. One has only to think of the antibiotic penicillin and the anti-cancer
drug paclitaxel.
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In 2015, Genomics England granted access to a subset of aggregated
data to twelve pharmaceutical, biotechnology and diagnostic companies
from the UK and abroad, including GSK, Roche and AstraZeneca, as part
of an industry trial. They asked each company to identify areas of improve-
ment in data collection and to invest money (a fee of £250,000) and staff
(scientists and bioinformaticians) to aid the storage, security and analysis
of data. These companies have been obliged to publish all research from
the industry trial ‘at the point at which intellectual property for any
product is protected, in common with best practice in the pharmaceutical
industry’.47 Notably, intellectual property is only ‘protected’ once all the
relevant patents are granted: something that will normally occur only 5–15
years after the initial invention. Thus this is by no means a promise of
rapid publication. As Samuel and Farsides48 comment, ‘little is known
about the outcome of this trial . . . [and] how the ethical issues associated
with partnering with commercial entities might unfold’. Several other
commercial companies, including Illumina, have access to the data centre
or data pipelines because they are providing technical services, such as
computing infrastructure, data storage or genome analysis.
At its core, 100kGP is a vehicle through which the government can
build a database and capabilities to analyse the data that can lead to health
benefits and stimulate economic growth. Indeed, when launching the
project in 2012, then-Prime Minister David Cameron stated his govern-
ment’s desire ‘to see the emergence of genomic platforms in the UK that
. . . support the emergence of new companies and innovations’ leading to
the developments of ‘valuable new products that are sold around the
world’.49
8.4 Ethical Questions
The developments regarding care.data 2.0 and 100kGP validate Donna
Dickenson’s concern that: ‘Me Medicine is eclipsing what I call We
47 Genomics England, ‘FAQs about how we are working with industry’ (2014), www
.genomicsengland.co.uk/working-with-industry/working-with-industry-faqs, accessed 6
November 2017.
48 Gabrielle Natalie Samuel and Bobbie Farsides, ‘The UK’s 100,000 Genomes Project:
manifesting policymakers’ expectations’ (2017) 36(4) New Genetics and Society
336–53.
49 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS), ‘Industrial strategy: government
and industry in partnership. Strategy for UK life sciences. One year on’ (2013), www.gov
.uk/government/collections/industrial-strategy-government-and-industry-in-partner
ship, accessed 6 November 2017.
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Medicine, so that we’re losing sight of the notion that biotechnology can
and should serve the common good’.50Without pretending to be exhaus-
tive, in this section we will discuss three ethical issues that these schemes
highlight.
8.4.1 Obfuscatory Language and Promissory Discourse
NHS England and Genomics England use the contentious terms ‘perso-
nalised care’ and ‘personalised medicine’. The terms are often used
interchangeably with ‘precision medicine’ and ‘stratified medicine’51.
Donna Dickenson has observed that:
[O]ne meaning of personalized medicine that does seem genuinely ben-
eficial [is] drug treatment tailored to the patient on an evidence-based
model for better clinical care. Whether that’s really personalized in the
sense of individualized, however, is arguable . . . individuals are classified
into groups according to which allele (variant) of the relevant gene they
have . . . Even the biotechnology industry-linked Personalized Medicine
Coalition concedes that pharmacogenetics is about population subgroup
response to particular drugs.52
However, she also rightly remarks that ‘Patients’ enthusiasm for phar-
macogenetics would take quite a hit if they saw it as a rationale for
denying them therapy, but in an era of cost cutting, that’s exactly what
could happen.’53
Indeed, highly targeted ‘personalised’ drugs (i.e. ‘MeMedicine’ – help-
ing me and people like me), available at huge mark-ups over the produc-
tion costs, could reduce the strength of the population-wide ‘safety net’
(‘We Medicine’) that is the NHS. What’s more, personalised care could
lead to an even more fragmented NHS. In an ethnographic study explor-
ing the translation of stratified medicine into a London cancer centre,
Day and colleagues found that:
[S]tratified medicine placed additional strains on the service through its
requirement for a highly-skilled workforce and a meticulously integrated
patient pathway that, in the context of budget constraints, were difficult to
deliver. Highly-skilled staff have moved increasingly to back-office func-
tions such as laboratory analysis [and] replaced in frontline functions by
50 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 2.
51 Sara Day, R. Charles Coombes and Louise McGrath-Lone, ‘Stratified, precision or
personalised medicine? Cancer services in the “real world” of a London hospital’ (2017)
39 Sociology of Health and Illness 143–58.
52 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 8. 53 Ibid., p. 75.
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less qualified staff following the protocols of the new medicine . . . [T]his
recalibration of staff roles has enabled hospitals to trim budgets and carry
on, but staff and patients alike reported increasing fragmentation
and particular difficulties in coordinating the steps along a pathway . . .
[M]easures to improve coordination and navigation . . . do not always
work, with the result that some patients describe care that is far from
personalised.54
Echoing Day’s findings, Samuel and Farsides highlight ‘the pitfalls of
unfulfilled promissory genohype’ around the 100kGP. They found that
staff at, or working with, Genomics England, felt that policymakers
driving the project had ‘grandiose expectations’: implementation
brought several organisational tensions, for example, about whether the
‘cash-strapped busy’ NHS and ‘stressed and busy’ staff not trained in
genomics would be capable of delivering the project. Other participants
felt that the political rhetoric surrounding the project, and the fact that an
‘entrepreneurial company’ was responsible for the project, was a positive
force – mobilising the project and overcoming so-called clinical inertia.
As one participant said, ‘The objective was . . . to drive this fast . . . and
not to give people time to downgrade it’.55 Along similar, but less
positive, lines, a Lancet editorial from 2017 about the UK Chief
Medical Officer’s report cites research that whole-genome sequencing is
unlikely to benefit day-to-day care and argues that the NHS might not be
the right place to mainstream genomic medicine because it is struggling
to deliver even basic services.56
The promissory discourse that is so prevalent in relation to both care.
data and 100kGP is particularly problematic in view of the multiple
unanswered questions and epistemological challenges that surround
Big Data projects in biomedicine. These challenges imply fundamental
questions regarding the scientific utility and validity of these types of
projects, and each of the epistemological problems also has ethical
implications.57 All these problems simply remain unmentioned, so as
not to threaten the hype, it would seem.
54 Day, Coombes and McGrath-Lone, ‘Stratified, precision or personalised medicine?’,
p. 154.
55 Samuel and Farsides, ‘The UK’s 100,000 Genomes Project’.
56 Editorial, ‘Public genomes: the future of the NHS?’ (2017) 390 The Lancet 203.
57 We do not have the space here to elaborate on this, but for particularly interesting
discussions of the problems involved, see, for example, John Ioannidis, ‘Informed con-
sent, big data, and the oxymoron of research that is not research’ (2013) 13(4) American
Journal of Bioethics 40–2; Wendy Lipworth, Paul Mason, Ian Kerridge et al., ‘Ethics and
epistemology in big data research’ (2017) 14(4) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 489–500;
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8.4.2 The Ethical (In)Defensibility of the Consent Models
As we have hinted at above, the ‘consent’model for care.data 2.0 is hugely
problematic. The consent model in 100kGP has some shortcomings, but
the project is much more limited in scope.
8.4.2.1 The Opt-Out Model Recommended by the Caldicott
Review
The Privacy Impact Assessment of care.data undertaken by NHS
England (NHS England 2014) made it clear that the GP data of
those registering an opt-out would be passed to the HSCIC and
would most likely be used in research to which those patients have
not consented:
Where patients have objected to the flow of their personal confidential
data from the general practice record, the HSCIC will receive clinical data
without any identifiers attached . . . If a patient is (a) content for personal
confidential data from their GP record to be extracted into the secure
environment of the HSCIC but (b) objects to flows of personal confiden-
tial data from the HSCIC . . . then the HSCIC will extract the fact of
the objection, the date of the objection and the individual’s NHS number.
The NHS number will be used internally within the HSCIC tomatch these
data to other data held for that patient so that the data can be anonymised
before release.58 (emphasis added)
In this context, ‘anonymisation’ actually meant ‘pseudonymisation’, a
‘technique that replaces identifiers with a pseudonym that uniquely
identifies a person’, i.e. what is frequently called ‘coding’ of health data.
Astoundingly, what is being said here is that a patient’s wish that their
confidential information is not extracted or used, is respected by extract-
ing and using the data anyway, but in pseudonymised form. This is not
what the average person understands by ‘opting out’ – arguably, people
understand this as meaning that their data will not be used in any way.
Little has changed in the wake of the Caldicott Report since the recom-
mended opt-outs relate only to ‘confidential patient information’, and,
as mentioned in Section 8.2.4 (‘Has the GDPR Any Effect?’), data
collected by NHS Digital and de-identified is not considered to be
confidential patient information. In other words, the opt-out is not
actually an opt-out. This scheme is simply care.data 2.0.
Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘The ethics of big data: Current and foreseeable
issues in biomedical contexts’ (2016) 22 Science and Engineering Ethics 303–41.
58 NHS England, ‘Privacy impact assessment: care.data’, pp. 9–10.
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This is ethically problematic. As argued by bioethicist Julian Savulescu:
Each [mature] person has values, plans, aspirations, and feelings about
how that life should go. People have values which may collide with
research goals . . . To ask a person’s permission to do something to that
person is to involve her actively and to give her the opportunity to make
the project a part of her plans. When we involve people in our projects
without their consent we use them as a means to our own ends.59
This illustrates why the care.data consent model amounts to a
violation of people’s autonomy. The principle of respect for auton-
omy is based on the principle of respect for persons.60 Respecting
people implies that they should be offered ethically appropriate and
clearly understandable ways to consent (or not) to have their health
records included in central databases. Except for purely privacy-
related concerns, de-identification of health data cannot overcome
any of the important ethical concerns that many people have about
the creation and use of databases and/or tissue banks for research
purposes.61 For example, various studies indicate that people may
consider commercial uses to be at odds with their original motiva-
tion to participate in research even when they explicitly agreed to
take part in research.62
59 Julian Savulescu, ‘For and Against: No consent should be needed for using leftover body
material for scientific purposes. Against’ (2000) 325 British Medical Journal 648–9, p. 649.
60 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report – Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979) www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-
policy/belmont-report/index.html, accessed 6 November 2017.
61 NBAC, ‘Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy
Guidance (Executive Summary)’ (1999) https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/
nbac/hbm_exec.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017; Kristof Van Assche, Serge
Gutwirth and Sigrid Sterckx, ‘Protecting dignitary interests of biobank research
participants: lessons from Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents’ (2013) 5
(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 54–84. At most, anonymisation might offer
protection with regard to privacy, although various studies suggest that even this
cannot be guaranteed. Genome data pose a high risk of re-identification. This is
doubly problematic since genome data have implications for the patient and her
family members. Melissa Gymrek, Amy L. McGuire, David Golan et al., ‘Identifying
personal genomes by surname inference’ (2013) 6117 Science 321–4.
62 Tore Nilstun and Göran Herméren, ‘Human tissue samples and ethics–attitudes of the
general public in Sweden to biobank research’ (2006) 9(1) Medicine Health Care and
Philosophy 81–6; John Arne Skolbekken, Lars Ø. Ursin, Berge Solberg et al., ‘Not worth
the paper it’s written on? Informed consent and biobank research in a Norwegian context’
(2005) 15 Critical Public Health 335–47.
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8.4.2.2 The Consent Model Underlying 100kGP
Policymakers are using the 100kGPmodel as a starting point to design an
appropriate approach to consent for NHS genomic medicine services. At
the time of writing, this approach was still in development.63 It remains
to be seen whether broad consent, i.e. consent for unspecified and
unknown research, and the entwinement of consent for the clinical
aspect (e.g. a primary diagnosis) and research will be carried forward.
Broad consent could be argued to be morally justified in the name of ‘We
Medicine’: seeking consent for individual studies could slow down
research of potential social value. However, the question arises as to
how the potential for benefit to the common good of any research project
can be assessed. Without an answer to this question, it is difficult to
justify the use of broad consent on the grounds of the common good.
Further questions arise, such as how public and individual interests can
be balanced and who should carry out these balancing exercises. In
100kGP, Genomics England’s Access Review Committee64 takes on this
role. It is up to NHS England to decide whether such a committee should
continue to exist post-100kGP.
As we will discuss next, notions of altruism and solidarity are some-
times invoked in arguments supporting broad consent. Caulfield and
Kaye have pointed out that there is a danger of conflating the idea that
people want to participate in a project ‘altruistically’ – in the name of the
common good – with the idea that the ethical and legal norm (i.e.
consent) should be altered in its service.65 Interestingly, some research
suggests that the public and patients do not see broad consent as accep-
table. A systematic review of studies from the USA showed that partici-
pants preferred tiered or specific forms of consent, and were less
supportive when data could be shared with pharmaceutical companies.66
Moreover, one survey of over 1000 participants found that initial support
for broad consent diminished once specific types of controversial
research (e.g. including research into safer abortion methods,
63 Becki Bennett, ‘What does consent mean for Generation Genome?’ (2017) BioNews, 18
September, www.bionews.org.uk/page_886840.asp, accessed 6 November 2017.
64 Chaired by Professor Jonathan Knowles, who is also chairman of the board of
Adappimunne Ltd and Immunocore Ltd, two UK-based biotechnology companies.
65 Tim Caulfield and Jane Kaye, ‘Broad consent in biobanking: reflections on seemingly
insurmountable dilemmas’ (2009) 10 Medical Law International 85–100.
66 Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, Nila A. Sathe, Armand H. Matheny Antommaria et al., ‘A
systematic literature review of individuals’ perspectives on broad consent and data
sharing in the United States’ (2016) 18(7) Genetics in Medicine 663–71.
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xenotransplantation and, notably, research that would lead to patents)
were raised as a possibility.67
Other research has shown that the general public is generally positive
towards medical research and is usually willing to participate without
expecting any personal benefit.68 However, the willingness to participate
decreases if the benefits to society are unclear or if private profits might
be derived.69
8.4.3 Appealing to Altruism: Furthering a Neoliberal Political Agenda?
Donna Dickenson identifies corporate interests and political neoliberal-
ism as one of the key drivers of ‘Me Medicine’. Neoliberalism includes
making significant cuts in public spending while at the same time
increasing the involvement of private corporations in areas such as
healthcare, education and scientific research (and outsourcing from the
public to the private sector of an increasing number of services).70With
regard to biomedicine and healthcare, the neoliberal nature of the poli-
tical agenda is very clear.
For health services, the agenda translates into the following
stratification:
(a) to keep the voters happy, a basic, low-level service should be paid for
by the state;
(b) a higher-level service should be available to those who pay, directly
or via insurance;
67 Raymond G. De Vries, Tom Tomlinson, H. Myra Kim et al., ‘The moral concerns of
biobank donors: the effect of non-welfare interests on willingness to donate’ (2016) 12 Life
Sciences, Society and Policy 3.
68 Dianne Nicol and Christine R. Critchley, ‘Benefit sharing and biobanking in Australia’
(2012) 21(5) Public Understanding of Science 534–55.
69 Christine R. Critchley, Dianne Nichol, Margaret F. A. Otlowski et al., ‘Predicting inten-
tion to biobank: a national survey’ (2012) 22 European Journal of Public Health 139–44;
Åsa Kettis-Lindblad, Lena Ring, Eva Viberth et al., ‘Genetic research and donation of
tissue samples to biobanks. What do potential sample donors in the Swedish general
public think?’ (2006) 16(4) European Journal of Public Health 433–40; Saskia C.
Sanderson, Michael A. Diefenbach, Randi Zinberg et al., ‘Willingness to participate in
genomics research and desire for personal results among underrepresented minority
patients: a structured interview study’ (2013) 4(4) Journal of community genetics 469–
82; Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori, ‘The One-Way Mirror’.
70 Damien Cahill and Martijn Konings, Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017);
Owen Jones, The Establishment: And How They Get Away With It (London: Allan
Lane, 2014).
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(c) extremely expensive services should be paid for by the state, but on a
rationed basis;
(d) expensive infrastructure, for whatever purpose, should be paid for by
the state; and
(e) value from the services provided by and infrastructure generated by
the state should, as far as is possible, be channelled into the private
arena.
Indeed, as Donna Dickenson observes, ‘at the highest governmental
levels, public backing has been solicited to underpin private-sector profit
making from biotechnology’.71 Moreover, ‘[the] public sector, as the
entrepreneurial state, is being asked to sponsor the growth and shoulder
the risks for the private sector’.72
Interestingly, two simultaneous trends can be observed in the UK:
while healthcare and social care data are centralised for research pur-
poses, the provision of healthcare itself is being decentralised. Indeed,
accompanied by a narrative about building healthcare services ‘around
the needs of local populations’, the UK government has announced the
‘restructuring’ of the NHS through so-called ‘Sustainability and
Transformation Plans’ (STPs). A total of 44 geographical areas (‘foot-
prints’) are created that need to develop strategic plans to rationalise
services. This is arguably a further step in the process of dismantling the
NHS as a national health service. The STPs, like care.data, suggest that
‘sustainability’ and economic growth have become the de facto social
values. Moreover, ‘Individuals, rather than organisations or public insti-
tutions, are forced to deal with the healthcare, social and financial con-
sequences of ever-increasing and ambiguous data dissemination
practices among entities they are not always aware of’.73
Yet, as we have hinted at in our discussion about broad consent, the
neoliberal political agenda is veiled with references to benefits for all and
altruism. For example, care.data was promoted by the UK government as
a scheme that would ‘improve the quality of care for all’.74 In the case of
the 100kGP, the message is that the project enhances altruism and that
people who take part are altruistic. As Woods75 has pointed out,
71 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 21. 72 Ibid., p. 180.
73 Vezyridis and Timmons, ‘Dissenting from care.data’.
74 NHS England webpage previously available at: www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-
data/better-care.
75 SimonWoods, ‘Big Data governance: solidarity and the patient voice’ in Brent Mittelstadt
and Luciano Floridi (eds.), The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data (Springer International,
2016), pp. 221–38.
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Genomics England has used this rhetoric to rally the public to a common
cause and to implicitly call upon their civic duty to endorse the project. In
this way, 100kGP appeals to the best of ‘WeMedicine’ (i.e. the production
of wide social goods through the coming together of rare disease and
cancer communities), and ‘Me Medicine’ (i.e. the chance of a precise
diagnosis and treatments). It draws on the language of ‘We Medicine’,
with the ultimate promise of (and hopes for immediate) ‘Me Medicine’.
The frequent invoking of the principle of altruism echoes the dis-
courses that have surrounded older healthcare and research ventures,
such as National Blood Donation and UK Biobank. The form of altruism
applied in such discourses was Richard Titmuss’s (1970) ‘gift relation-
ship’. An altruistic act within a gift relationship is one that is voluntary
and that has no expectation of return. 100kGP is purported to promote
altruism and the people taking part are doing so because, at least in part,
they are altruistic. Speaking to the Financial Times, Professor
Mark Caulfield (Chief Scientific Officer) has assumed that the partici-
pants are well aware that few will see pharmaceutical benefits themselves:
‘[T]hey’ve enrolled on the principle that this is altruistic, and they don’t
expect any personal benefit. They’re doing it because they want someone
else to have a better chance than they did.’76
However, as we have said, the 100kGP does offer (although does not
promise) clinical benefit. So is it accurate to say that people are partici-
pating to benefit others? It is likely that at least some are participating to
get a diagnosis. Caulfield’s assumption, and the references to altruism,
thus seem inappropriate.
What function is this rhetoric about common good, civic duty and
altruism serving? As others have argued with regard to the biobanks that
came before 100kGP, it detracts from the role of industry and from
concerns that participants might have about injustice in the research
enterprise.77 It also deflects from the glimmer of hope that there will be a
diagnosis or a treatment (the ‘Me Medicine’ aspect). It masks the ques-
tion as to whether, if new drugs come out of the project, the NHS will
even be able to afford them if it is privatised further. This would be a clear
76 Richard Hodson and Clive Cookson, ‘NHS launches genetic sequencing centres to
develop treatments’ (2014) Financial Times, 22 December.
77 Richard Tutton and Barbara Prainsack, ‘Enterprising or altruistic selves? Making up
research subjects in genetics research’ (2011) 33(7) Sociology of Health and Illness
1081–95; Lars Ø. Ursin, ‘Biobank research and the welfare state project: the HUNT
story’ (2010) 20(4) Critical Public Health 453–63.
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loss for ‘We Medicine’ as a whole, and a win for ‘Me Medicine’ but only
for those who can afford expensive treatments.
While the two schemes we discuss in this chapter purport to promote
the common good, we would submit that fairness requires real benefit-
sharing and not just rhetoric. The HSCIC reassures people that it will not
make a profit from providing data to other organisations, but will only
charge an access fee to cover its costs. While this may look unproble-
matic, what it means is that commercial companies are provided access to
assets they have not themselves bought or created and are thus being
given a quasi-free commercial boost by the UK government. However, to
put NHS databases at the disposal of industry, without requiring a ‘kick-
back’ to enhance the service that the NHS is set up to provide, is
inappropriate. The mere fact that a new drug might reach the market is
not sufficient to count as benefit-sharing with UK citizens, since this
benefit (the new drugs) is then also available for citizens in other coun-
tries, whose health data has not been mined by the companies in ques-
tion. Instead, the companies seeking access should be required to provide
the NHSwith reduced access costs for the resulting drugs or other health-
related products. With data being collected from the UK population at
the expense of the UK state, we are talking about a concealed Public
Private Initiative: something which should not be entered into unless the
benefits to the private party are at least balanced by the benefits to the
public as a whole.
8.5 Concluding Remarks: Trust versus Trustworthiness
The huge controversy surrounding the care.data scheme clearly showed
that the various misleading elements of the scheme undermined citizens’
trust. The Caldicott Review78 and the UKChiefMedical Officer’s report79
rightly mention repeatedly that trust is essential for making any such
scheme work. However, we should emphasise that there is a difference
between being trusted andmeriting trust (i.e. being trustworthy). In order
to merit any trust, those who acquire health data ought to make sure that
they respect the autonomy of individuals whom they expect to entrust
them with their health data.
Does the ‘architecture’ proposed by the Caldicott Review and the Chief
Medical Officer’s report represent a scheme that is trustworthy?
78 Caldicott, ‘Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-outs’.
79 Davies, ‘Generation Genome’.
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Transparency is a crucial prerequisite, both for trust and trustworthi-
ness. Regarding care.data 2.0, unfortunately, the misleading and obfus-
cation continue. In spite of all the Caldicott Review’s talk about opt-
outs, it is clear that the scheme is not in fact based on an opt-out regime,
since, as explained above, a patient’s wish that their confidential infor-
mation is not extracted or used, is met by extracting and using the data
in de-identified form. This makes a mockery of the claim that people
can opt out. If somebody opts out, that should mean that their data are
simply not extracted and used, i.e. HSCIC should receive no data, not
even in ‘de-identified’ form.
It is clear from NHS England’s response to Caldicott and from NHS
Digital’s draft target architecture from July 2017 that NHS England is
intent on pressing ahead with care.data 2.0 with a fig-leaf of a national
opt-out and the illusory regional fragmentation of the National Data
Lake it so desperately wants to create. Health data is to be conscripted
regardless.
The consent model underlying the 100kGP arguably might be
ethically defensible, on the grounds that the research might promote
the common good. However, it is not clear how ‘common good’ will
be defined by policymakers and how the involvement of industry
will affect the nature and the extent of any benefits to society. As we
have discussed, appeals to altruism can be a thin veil for the neo-
liberal drive behind ‘Me Medicine’ schemes and the drastic impact
they could have for the NHS and its users. As Dickenson points out,
there is a danger that, eventually, people will ‘perceive that their
altruism is being exploited by commercialisation’.80 Those who feel
exploited will have little recourse, as a commenter on The Times
newspaper’s coverage of the NHS ‘National Data Lake’ has
pointed out:
[O]nly the very wealthy have a choice as to whether they want a relation-
ship with the NHS . . . however much someone may dislike or distrust the
NHS, they cannot seek medical treatment elsewhere. The NHS may want
to appear to encourage people to be altruistic . . . but they come very close
to compelling rather than promoting the altruism. We are being asked to
sign up to the rules of a club that most of us cannot leave.81
80 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 199.
81 R.Moss, Comment on article by Kat Lay, ‘NHS to share opt-out patients’ data’ (2017) The
Times, 19 September.
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Clearly, care.data 2.0 and the 100kGP are using the NHS ‘brand’ to
generate trust in a health service that looks very different to the one set
up after WWII. However, trust should be merited and not manufactured
for the sake of generating support for whatever projects the government
wishes to implement.
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